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Comments
Pennsylvania Marital Agreements
"The common law does not regulate the form of agreements between
spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. The
consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love and
affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts."'
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to explore the law in Pennsylvania
with respect to antenuptial and postnuptial agreements. 2 This material
will be presented in the following order: (1) a look at the case of Hille-
gass Estatea which is said to be the final word in Pennsylvania's ante-
nuptial law; (2) a presentation of some stereotype factors which make
up the hypothetical antenuptial agreement situation dealt with through-
out the paper; (3) the two-pronged disjunctive test for antenuptial
agreements; (4) a miscellaneous section containing such matters as oral
agreements, family exemption, divorce, support, equity, wife as creditor,
and the presence of an attorney; (5) a look at the law of postnuptial
agreements; (6) the factors which should be included in every ante-
nuptial agreement; and (7) a conclusion.
I. Hillegass Estate
In 1968 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hillegass EstateA an-
nounced what it believed to be the final word in Pennsylvania in the
confused area of antenuptial agreements. The court was extremely
positive in its opinion and stated that this case stood for the true ex-
pression of Pennsylvania law and that all prior inconsistent case law
was overruled. 5 The court overstated its position on antenuptial agree-
1. Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579.
2. For a study of this area in earlier Pennsylvania cases, see Comment, Antenuptial
Agreements in Pennsylvania, 55 DicK. L. REV. 382 (1951). For a comprehensive study of
marital agreements in the United States, see A. LINDLEY, SEPARATIONS AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CoNRAars (1967).
3. 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 149, 244 A.2d at 675.
In the field of Antenuptial Agreements, the pertinent law has been differently and
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ments because even though this case may be the final statement on the
general status of the law, there are a multitude of situations which
factually differ from the Hillegass case and cannot be fully adjudicated
using only the principles announced in that case.
In the Hillegass case, the husband died at the age of 76 leaving an
estate of $265,876. His widow, who he had married five years earlier,
filed a petition to take against the husband's estate. Prior to the mar-
riage the two parties had entered into an antenuptial agreement which
provided: in consideration of the husband paying the wife $10,000, the
wife waived all interest in her husband's estate which had been fully
disclosed to her. The husband then complied with the agreement and
paid his wife $10,000.8
One principle stated in the Hillegass case is that the parties to an
antenuptial agreement stand in a relationship of mutual confidence
and trust. The spouse who gives up his or her statutory rights in the
estate of the other spouse is to receive a reasonable provision in light
of the circumstances. In the absence of such a reasonable provision the
spouse who has given up statutory rights is to receive full and fair dis-
closure of all pertinent facts and circumstances.7 The court went on to
state that the reasonableness of the provision is to be determined as
of the date of the agreement and not at a later date. Also, the court
propounded a list of criteria to determine reasonableness.8 Many ques-
tions are left open by this case which is supposed to be the final state-
ment of the law in this area. The Hillegass case does not explain which
factors are to be most heavily weighted in determining whether the
provision for the wife was adequate. The definition of disclosure is not
made clear because the court does not state whether disclosure means
divulging all of one's assets or whether assets must be disclosed and the
rights being given up by the wife must also be disclosed. Another
varyingly expressed in a number of cases, with the result that in several respects the
law is not as clear, definite and certain as it should be. We shall therefore eliminate
the confusion and conflicts resulting from different expressions of the applicable
standards and principles by stating dearly and more definitely the applicable standards
and principles in this field.
The footnotes to the above paragraph of the opinion states:
We have carefully examined and reviewed the facts and law in each and all of the
prior cases, and any statement. of law or of the appropriate test standards or principles
in any of them which is contrary to or modifies or changes the hereinafter stated
standards or tests or principles are hereby disapproved and nullified.
Id. (asterisk).
6. Id. at 146-48, 244 A.2d at 673-75.
7. Id. at 149, 244 A.2d at 675.
8. Id. at 150, 244 A.2d at 676.
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question left unanswered by Hillegass is whether a schedule of assets,
attached to an antenuptial agreement, necessarily implies full and fair
disclosure. Whether the spouse who gives up rights has to be advised
by independent counsel is a further question not resolved by the Hille-
gass case. Since these and other questions remain unanswered by
Hillegass much of the pre-Hillegass case law is still vital to courts de-
ciding antenuptial agreement issues and to attorneys drafting ante-
nuptial agreements.
II. STEREOTYPE CASE
The Stereotype situation which will be dealt with throughout this
work will include the following factors: (1) an antenuptial agreement
in which the wife gives up all rights in her husband's estate in exchange
for some monetary consideration; (2) a man who is well advanced in his
years and is contemplating marriage with a woman somewhat younger
than he; (3) a man having considerable financial means; (4) a con-
templated second or third marriage for the man; (5) some adult chil-
dren of the prior marriage or marriages of the man; (6) the death of the
husband after the marriage; (7) the widow attempting to take her stat-
utory share against the will of the deceased husband;9 and (8) the chil-
dren of the prior marriages asserting the antenuptial agreement as a
defense to the widow's election to take against the will. There will be
variations in the factual situations in many of the instances analyzed
in this work but these eight factors represent the basic dispute in most
antenuptial agreement cases. One other factor which must be kept in
mind as being present in antenuptial agreements, as well as the eight
stereotype factors, is that of uberrima ides,o abundant good faith be-
tween the parties to the agreement."'
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2508 (1973) (this is the new Consolidated Probate, Estates &
Fiduciaries Code):
(a) Right of election. When a married person dies testate as to any part of his estate,
the surviving spouse while living shall have a right of election under the limitations
and conditions hereinafter stated: Provided, That the spouse so electing must also
elect to take against all conveyances within the scope of section 6111(a) of this code
(relating to conveyances to defeat marital rights), of which he is a beneficiary.
(b) Share of estate. The surviving spouse, upon an election to take against the will,
shall be entitled to one-third of the real and personal estate of the testator if the
testator is survived by more than one child or by one or more children and the issue
of a deceased child or children or by the issue of more than one deceased child, and
in all other circumstances the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the
real and personal estate of the testator.
10. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1690 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
11. Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa. 302, 15 A. 629 (1888).
The relation (between betrothed persons) is one of such extreme mutual confidence
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In referring to the spouse who is giving up rights in return for either
a reasonable provision or full disclosure this writer uses the female
gender. All principles are equally applicable when the male partner of
the marriage is the one who is giving up his rights in the estate of the
female, but since it is more often the case that the female is giving up
rights in the estate of the male, the spouse referred to as the wife in this
work is the one who has given up rights.
III. REASONABLE PROVISION
One of the two prongs of the Hillegass test for the validity of an
antenuptial agreement is a reasonable, adequate provision for the wife,12
in return for her giving up of her rights in the estate of the husband.
One question that the Hillegass case did answer was that of the burden
of proof. The party seeking to nullify the antenuptial agreement has the
burden of showing that there was no reasonable provision for the wife
and that there was no fair disclosure of the husband's worth. 3 Cases
prior to Hillegass14 held that where there was an adequate provision
for the wife, a presumption of designed concealment arises and the
burden of proof is shifted to the husband to rebut this presumption.
When there is no evidence to prove or disprove disclosure of assets, the
placement of the burden of proof will be the decisive factor in deter-
mining which side will be successful. The Hillegass court would find
for the husband when there were no facts as to disclosure and an un-
reasonable provision for the wife while prior cases would find for the
that a special duty of full disclosure arises which has no place in the ordinary con-
tractual relation. Thus, in the case of Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, we said: "There is
perhaps no relation of life in which more unbounded confidence is reposed than in
that existing between parties who are betrothed to each other. Especially does the
woman place the most implicit trust in the truth and affection of him in whose keep-
ing she is about to deposit the happiness of her future life. From him she has no
secrets; she believes he has none from her. To consider such persons as in the same
category with buyers and sellers, and to say they are dealing at arms' length, we
think is a mistake. Surely when a man and a woman are on the eve of marriage and
it is proposed to them, as in this instance, to enter into an ante-nuptial contract
upon the subject of the enjoyment and disposition of their respective estates, it is the
duty of each to be frank and unreserved in the disclosure of all circumstances materi-
ally bearing on the contemplated agreement. We held that the relation existing be-
tween betrothed persons was one of the confidential relations which require uberrima
fides in all transactions between them.
Id. at 318-19, 15 A. 633.
12. 431 Pa. at 149, 244 A.2d at 675.
13. Id. at 150, 244 A.2d at 675.
14. McClellan Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Groff's Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 19 A.2d
107 (1941); Neely's Appeal, 124 Pa. 406, 16 A. 883 (1889); Mauk's Estate 19 Pa. Super. 338
(1902).
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wife in this same situation. In Mauk's Estate5 the court said:
The provision not being adequate for the maintenance of the
widow, the question arose whether it was so disproportionate to
the estate of the husband so as to raise the presumption of designed
concealment, and throw upon those who sought to interpose con-
tract as a bar to the widow's right the burden of disproof.' 6
In this case the burden was not met by the representative of the hus-
band's estate and the widow was successful in setting aside the ante-
nuptial agreement.' 7 In this particular case the husband's estate was
worth approximately eleven thousand dollars and the six hundred
dollar provision for the wife was held to be inadequate.'8
Another pre-Hillegass case which shifted the burden of proof to the
legatees to prove full disclosure when an inadequate provision was
made for the wife is Haberman Estate.'9 In that case the husband had
an estate of approximately seventeen thousand dollars and the wife was
given a house to live in as her sole provision. There were no funds
given to her for maintenance and support. Again, as in Mauk the lega-
tees could not meet the burden of disproving fraudulent concealment.20
Hillegass' placing of this burden on the person attempting to invalidate
the antenuptial agreement is a complete reversal of prior case law
which placed this burden on the estate of the husband where an inade-
quate provision was made for the wife. In light of the general Penn-
sylvania policy to protect the rights of a surviving spouse 2' the Hillegass
case should not have reversed the law as far as shifting the burden of
proof to the husband where an inadequate provision was made for the
wife.
The Hillegass case did restate one essential provision in determining
the adequacy of the provision for the wife, which is that this adequacy
will be determined in light of the time when the agreement was made.22
Hindsight and later accumulation of wealth plays no role in deter-
mining the adequacy and reasonableness of the provision.
15. 19 Pa. Super. 338 (1902).
16. Id at 342.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 341.
19. 239 Pa. 10, 86 A. 641 (1913).
20. Id. at 11, 86 A. at 642.
21. Gelb Estate, 425 Pa. 117, 228 A.2d 367 (1966).
Pennsylvania has always carefully protected the rights of a widow in her husband's
estate, particularly, as in this case, where the husband and wife have lived harmoni-
ously together for years prior to the death of the husband.
Id. at 125, 288 A.2d 371-72.
22. 431 Pa. at 150, 244 A.2d at 675.
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A vague test for adequacy was stated in 1950 in McClellan's Estate:23
It is also well established that in considering the adequacy of the
provisions for a wife in an ante-nuptial agreement, all of the rel-.
evant facts and circumstances surrounding the case must be con-
sidered; and the true test of adequacy is whether the provision for
the intended wife is sufficient to enable her to live comfortably
after her husband's death in substantially the same way as, consid-
ering all the circumstances, she had previously lived.24
In 1889, Neely's Appeal25 announced its criteria for determining the
adequacy of the provision for the wife.26 Kaufmann's Estate27 in 1961
announced six criteria which were to be considered in determining the
adequacy of the provision for the wife: (1) the financial worth of the
husband; (2) the financial worth of the wife; (3) the age of the parties;
(4) the number of children .of each of the parties; (5) the intelligence of
the parties; and (6) whether the wife aided in the accumulation of the
wealth.28 Hillegass adopted these criteria as promulgated in the Kauf-
mann case and added the criterion of considering the standard of living
of the survivor before the marriage and that which that survivor could
expect after the marriage.29
IV. FULL DISCLOSURE
The second prong of the Hillegass test for the validity of an ante-
nuptial agreement is that in the absence of the first prong (reasonable,
adequate provision for the wife) the husband must make a full and
fair disclosure.30 It is very clear that these two prongs are stated in the
disjunctive. One need not consider whether there was a full and fair
disclosure if one decides that there has been an adequate provision for
the wife. Along these same lines is the fact that one can give the wife a
nominal provision or no provision at all if one makes full and fair
disclosure.
23. 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950).
24. ld. at 405, 75 A.2d 597.
25. 124 Pa. 406, 16 A. 883 (1889).
26. Id. at 426, 16 A. at 884.
When we consider the question of the adequacy of the provision we must regard all
the circumstances surrounding the case. This was a marriage between persons well ad-
vanced in years. The appellant was not the mother of his children, nor was she
likely ever to bear him any. She had not in any way aided him to accumulate his
fortune.
27. 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961).
28. Id. at 137, 171 A.2d at 51.
29. 431 Pa. at 150, 244 A.2d at 676.
30. Id., 244 A.2d at 675.
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As stated earlier, the Hillegass case puts the burden of showing non-
disclosure on the party trying to invalidate the antenuptial agreement
even where there is a wholly inadequate provision for the wife. The
court held in that case that since there was no proof to rebut the alle-
gation contained in the clause in the agreement which stated that full
disclosure had been made, that there was full disclosure regardless of
the provision made for the wife.3 1 This holding is opposite earlier cases
like Slagle's Appeal32 which called for a presumption of fraudulent
concealment when the provision for the wife was unreasonably dispro-
portionate to the means of the husband.
One question that arises in terms of full and fair disclosure is whether
the husband need only disclose the dollar value of his assets or whether
he must both disclose this dollar value and fully disclose to the wife the
statutory share of his estate which she is giving up in signing the agree-
ment. A full and fair disclosure of the value of one's estate is absolutely
meaningless to a wife-to-be who does not know that by reason of her
marriage she will be entitled to a statutory share of her husband's dis-
closed assets.
Another problem which arises in the disclosure area is the question
of the clause in an antenuptial agreement which states that each spouse
has full knowledge of the extent of the other's assets. It is arguable that
this is merely a boilerplate clause which is of no value. But if a dis-
closure clause in an antenuptial agreement is considered valueless, what
happens in the situation where the husband has actually fully disclosed
to his wife and puts a clause in the agreement to that effect.
The Vallish Estate33 case held that a full disclosure clause in an ante-
nuptial agreement was not conclusive evidence of this disclosure but
only rebuttable prima facie evidence.3 4 This court held that the refusal
of the court below to allow the wife to bring in evidence to rebut the
full disclosure clause in the agreement placed too much of an obstacle
in the wife's path to allow her to show that there was no full and fair
disclosure.3 5 Other earlier cases have taken this same position that a
full disclosure clause in an antenuptial agreement is not conclusive
31. Id. at 152-53, 244 A.2d at 677.
32. 294 Pa. 442, 144 A. 426 (1928).
33. 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968).
34. Id. at 96, 244 A.2d at 749.
35. Id. at 100-01, 244 A.2d at 751.
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but only prima facie evidence of disclosure which can be overcome by
positive facts to the contrary.30
In McClellan Estate7 the court speaks of nondisclosure as fraud and
states that a court has the inherent right to set aside any contract for
fraud. Fraud is defined by this court in terms of silence as well as posi-
tive assertion. One might be able to argue that if a husband merely
discloses his assets to his wife but is silent as to the rights she is giving
up by signing the agreement, that this silence is a fraud on the wife
and is grounds to vitiate the antenuptial contract.
The Hillegass case38 as well as Emery's Estate39 held that one need
not disclose the exact value of one's estate to one's wife where the wife
knows that the husband is a man of large financial means. In re Perel-
man's Estate 40 was a case where the wife claimed that the husband's
failure to disclose a $15,000 tax free income from a life estate in a
trust rendered the agreement invalid. The court said that it would not
look into such factors as earning capacity, salary, expected gifts, possible
inheritances, or other contingent factors to determine if a full and fair
disclosure has been made. They stated that the only things that must
be divulged are currently owned assets that are subject to an individ-
ual's testamentary control.41
Flannery's Estate42 is a case where there was no disclosure of assets
to the wife when she signed an antenuptial agreement. The attorney
for the husband argued that since the wife resided in the same neigh-
borhood where the husband's properties were located that this imparted
knowledge to her of the nature of her husband's estate. The court did
not feel that this was enough of a disclosure to validate the anatenuptial
agreement.43
The full disclosure prong of the test for the validity of an antenuptial
36. McCready's Estate, 316 Pa. 246, 175 A. 554 (1934); Gelb Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d
203 (O.C. Phila. Co. 1966).
37. 365 Pa. at 407, 75 A.2d at 598. The court quotes from Reichert Estate, 356 Pa. 269,
274, 51 A.2d 615, 617 (1947), stating:
As a general rule, fraud consists in anything calculated to deceive, whether by single
act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a suggestion of what is false, whether
it be direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or
gesture. It is any artifice by which a person is deceived to his disadvantage....
38. 431 Pa. at 151, 244 A.2d at 676.
39. 362 Pa. 142, 146, 66 A.2d 262, 264 (1949).
40. 438 Pa. 112, 263 A.2d 375 (1970).
41. Id. at 114, 263 A.2d at 376.
42. 315 Pa. 576, 173 A. 303 (1934).
43. Id. at 577-79, 173 A. at 304.
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agreement is murky at best. A husband need not necessarily attach a
schedule of his assets to the agreement; nor does exact disclosure have
to be made. It is clear where a husband gives an inadequate provision
to his wife in the agreement and makes a material misrepresentation
of the value of his estate that the antenuptial agreement is invalid.
V. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Oral Agreements
In 1842 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized oral antenuptial
agreements when it stated in Gackenbach v. Brouse:44
A parol antenuptial settlement such as this, being in considera-
tion of marriage which is a valid one, is binding at the expiration
of coverture. No statute requires it to be in writing where the sub-
ject of the contract is the wife's chattels; and here it covers the
whole case; for it precludes not only the husband's ownership dur-
ing coverture but his right of survivorship at the dissolution of it. 45
Of course antenuptial agreements are, as are other contracts, subject to
the Statute of Frauds, but since the all-encompassing Hillegass case
made no mention of oral antenuptial agreements, they remain valid as
being consistent with that case. In Hunt's Appeal,46 the court held that
an oral antenuptial agreement must be shown by those asserting it
by clear, convincing proof. More than a slight preponderance of the
evidence is necessary to show such an agreement. In this particular case
the court held against the finding of an oral antenuptial agreement. 47
B. Family Exemption
In Pennsylvania the widow is entitled to take $1500 as a family ex-
emption from the estate of her deceased spouse.4 A question which
arises is whether this exemption can be waived by antenuptial agree-
ment and what language is needed to waive such exemption. In Frucht-
man's Estate,49 the court attempts to explain when this exemption is
waived by an antenuptial agreement and when it is not. The court
44. 4 W. & S. 546 (Pa. 1842).
45. Id. at 547.
46. 100 Pa. 590 (1882).
47. Id. at 597.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3121 (1973) (this is also from the new Consolidated Probate,
Estates & Fiduciaries Code).
49. 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 208 (O.C. Phila. Co. 1969).
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looked at the language of some prior case law in order to make this
determination. One case which it viewed was Hughes' Estate50 where
there was a postnuptial agreement which provided that both spouses
would not take against the will of the other. The court in Hughes
stated that the family exemption was not an inheritance but a gratuity
prompted by public policy' The agreement not to take against the
spouse's will would not cancel the wife's right to take her family ex-
emption. The Hughes court looked at Jackson's Estate"' where the wife
waived all rights and demands of every character and description
against her husband's estate. The court in Jackson held that this lan-
guage was sufficient to effect a waiver of the widow's right to her family
exemption. Thus the general rule is that a waiver of all rights in one's
spouse's property, though there is no specific mention of the family
exemption, is sufficient to waive that exemption. Where the agreement
is more narrow such as a waiver not to take against the real and per-
sonal property of one's spouse as of the time of the agreement,52 the
wife will still be entitled to her family exemption.
C. Divorce
What is or should be the effect of divorce on a duly executed ante-
nuptial agreement? Should the divorce abrogate the agreement or should
the agreement be upheld notwithstanding the divorce? In Cavazza's
Estate,53 there was an antenuptial agreement in which a wife was to get
a certain monetary amount in exchange for her full release of all claims
in the estate of her husband. The husband argued, but the court did
not agree, that since the agreement was entered into in contemplation
of marriage, and the marriage is destroyed by divorce, that the agree-
ment must fail. The court held that the husband failed to protect his
interest and even though the wife was the guilty party in the divorce,
the agreement is not abrogated unless it contains a provision which
expressly invalidates the agreement upon divorce.54
Where the husband enters into a contract to pay his wife a specified
sum of money each month in return for her giving up all rights in his
estate, this contract is not vitiated by a subsequent divorce. One ques-
50. 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 601 (O.C. Chest. Co. 1966).
51. 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 402 (O.C. Montg. Co. 1964).
52. Landis Estate, 60 Berks 122, 124 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
53. 169 Pa. Super. 246, 82 A.2d 331 (1951).
54. Id. at 247-48, 82 A.2d at 332.
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tion not answered to date by Pennsylvania case law is what effect annul-
ment has on an antenuptial agreement. In the case of a divorce the
marriage is initially admitted but then destroyed, while in annulment
the marital status is said to never have existed. The same question
arises when there is an antenuptial agreement but no subsequent
marriage. It is submitted that since the marriage is consideration for
the agreement and in both aforementioned cases there is no marriage
thus a failure of consideration.
D. Support
One must ask what are the outer boundaries of what the wife can
contract away in her marital agreement. In Commonwealth v. Miller,55
there was an antenuptial agreement which provided that the husband
would not be liable for the education, maintenance, or support of the
children resulting from this marriage.56 The court held this clause to
be void as being contrary to public policy. The husband here was about
to marry a woman he knew to be pregnant and was attempting to es-
cape a duty which Pennsylvania law imposes on every husband.57 One
could argue that this case stands for a principle which is broader than
the facts of the case. That principle being that the outer limits which
any court with a conscience will allow in an antenuptial agreement will
be that the agreement must be within the gamut of public policy.
E. Equity
The Supreme Court of this State has consistently held that equi-
table principles will be applied to effectuate the intentions of the
parties as evidenced by their antenuptial agreements, written or
oral, where there is no fraud or over-reaching. 58
The court in Holwig's Estate 9 held that the husband could not revoke
an antenuptial agreement and take a share of his widow's estate. The
court felt that principles of equity force the effectuation of parties'
intentions as shown by their marital contract.00 One must remember
55. 20 West. 49 (Pa. C.P. 1930).
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 52.
58. Holwig's Estate, 348 Pa. 71, 74, 33 A.2d 915, 916 (1943).
59. 348 Pa. 71, 33 A.2d 915 (1943).
60. Id. at 74, 33 A.2d at 916.
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that this stream of equity underlies the entire atea of marital agree-
ments in drafting agreements, advising clients as to agreements, and
predicting how courts will decide issues relating to agreements.
F. Wife ad Creditor
Does an antenuptial agreement place a wife in the status of a creditor
of her husband's estate or is she considered a legatee? In Zeilchicks
Estate,61 there was an antenuptial agreement which provided that the
wife was to receive some specific real property from the estate of the
husband or, if that property had been sold, the wife was to receive
$10,000.00. in exchange the wife released all claims against her hus-
band's estate. The antenuptial agreement provisions were restated in
the will of the husband which also provided the son with some specific
property and the remainder interest in the estate. At the time of the
death of the husband the specific property granted to the wife. in the
agreement had been sold. The court made its position clear that
the wife was to take as a creditor and not as a legatee ag a result of the
antenuptial agreement.6
The son in this case argued that since specific property was granted
to him by will, that this constituted a waiver with respect to that specific
property, and the wife could not take her $i0,600.00 from that specific
property. The court held for the widow and decreed that the son should
sell the property specifically devised to him and pay the wife her
$10,000.00 out of the proceeds.64
One must ask if the wife will be better off in all circumstances when
treated as a creditor rather than a legatee. In many cases the wife will
get the best of both worlds since courts will look at her as more than
a mere creditor of the estate but rather hybrid: legatee-creditor
61. 46 Pa. 171, 251 A.9d 1i (1967).
62. Id. at 172-73, 231 A.2d at 132. -
63. Quoting from Pratt Estate, 422 Pa. 446, 450, 221 A.2d 117 (1966), the court stated:
The law is well settled that where a testator in his will gives specified property or a
share of his estate in exact or substantial compliance with the terms of his obligations
under an inter vivos property sWettlment (or fe§0paidn) agreement made with his
wife, that wife is a creditor of his estate and not a legatee under his will ...
(Emphasis in original)
The same principles which apply to property settlements made in contemplation
of sepaiation or divorce apply with equal f6rce t6 aitehuptial figreoi inits niide ifn
contemplation of ffiartiage.
Id. at 175-76, 251 A.d at 133 (dtatioh§ 6iitted).
64. Id. at 177, 231 A.2d at 133.
297
Duquesne Law Review
G. Presence of an Attorney
One writer 5 states that it is not ethical to have one attorney advise
both the husband and wife in regard to an antenuptial agreement in
light of the confidential relationship of husband and wife and the con-
flicting interests of the agreement. This same writer cites the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility which, in ethical
considerations numbers 5-15 and 5-16, limit the situations in which an
attorney can represent multiple clients. The writer concludes than an
antenuptial agreement is not in the category of situations where one
attorney can represent both parties. One can run into the problem of
whether the wife in the stereotype antenuptial agreement situation can,
and did, knowingly waive her opportunity to be separately represented.
In the McClellan case,66 an antenuptial agreement was prepared by
the attorney of the husband who brought his office assistant along to the
meeting of the parties in order to have his assistant represent the hus-
band's fiancee. The court stated in this case that this did not constitute
independent legal counsel for the wife.
Many inquiries are raised when one questions the necessity of the
wife having an attorney represent her at the signing of an antenuptial
agreement. Primarily, one must ask whether the wife must have advice
of counsel in order to have a binding agreement. Is an explanation of
the contract to the wife sufficient if this explanation comes from either
the husband or the husband's counsel? No Pennsylvania appellate court
has handed down a decision which states emphatically that the wife
must have independent legal counsel in order to have a valid ante-
nuptial agreement. This writer feels that in light of the policy in the
state of Pennsylvania to protect the spouse and to make sure her inter-
ests are not overreached, it would be reasonable for a court to decree
that all antenuptial agreements executed after a specified date will re-
quire that both spouses have independent legal counsel in order for
either to later assert the validity of that agreement.
VI. PosTNuPTiAL AGREEMENTS
In 1971 the case of Ratony's Estate67 held that the principles appli-
cable to antenuptial agreements are equally applicable to postnuptial
65. Cathey, Ante-nuptial Agreements in Arkansas-A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. REv.
275, 290 (1970).
66. 365 Pa. at 406-07, 75 A.2d at 598.
67. 443 Pa. 454, 277 A.2d 791 (1971).
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agreements. 68 This means that the two-pronged test of the 1968 Hille-
gass case and all case law consistent with that case can be applied to
postnuptial agreements. Problems in the postnuptial agreement area
arise often because of the distinction between postnuptial agreements
and separation agreements.
Commonwealth ex rel. DiValerio v. DiValerio69 described the differ-
ence between postnuptial and separation agreements by distinguishing
between situations where there is a full and fair determination of the
separate property of the spouses and where there is no such determina-
tion. The postnuptial agreement calls for a final division of the prop-
erty rights of the spouses and this agreement is not abrogated upon sub-
sequent reconciliation of the parties while a separation agreement is a
giving up of the wife's right to support for some property settlement
and is abrogated by subsequent reconciliation."0
Muhr's Estate71 looked at the effect of a divorce on a separation agree-
ment. The agreement provided that the wife should receive $3.00 per
week in lieu of all of her claims against the husband's estate. The hus-
band then got a divorce from his wife on the grounds of her adultery.
The court disagreed with the husband that this divorce terminated the
agreement and the husband's duty to pay. Since the husband retained
the benefits of the agreement regardless of the divorce, he must keep
his end if the contract.7 2 The Muhr case is consistent with Cavazza's
Estate7 3 mentioned earlier in this comment, which dealt with whether a
divorce abrogated an antenuptial agreement.
In a 1955 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the failure
of the husband to provide the consideration in a postnuptial agreement
68. Id. at 458, 277 A.2d at 793.
69. 169 Pa. Super. 477, 82 A2d 687 (1951).
Whether the articles of separation constitute a post-nuptial agreement or merely a
separation agreement depends on the intent of the parties as gathered from all the
facts. Where parties decide to settle and dispose of their respective property rights
finally and for all time, such agreement should be construed as a post-nuptial agree.
ment. Commonwealth ex rel. Makowski v. Makowski, 163 Pa. Super. 441, 444, 62 A.2d
71. The subsequent reconciliation of the parties does not abrogate such a post-nuptial
agreement. Ray's Estate, 304 Pa. 421, 156 A. 64. On the other hand, a separation agree-
ment does not constitute, nor is it intended to constitute a full and final determina-
tion of the separate property rights of the parties; it is customarily a surrender of the
wife's right to support in consideration of some property settlement. Subsequent re-
conciliation and cohabitation presumably end a separations agreement.
Id. at 479-80, 82 A.2d at 688.
70. Id.
71. 59 Pa. Super. 393 (1915).
72. Id. at 395-96.
73. 169 Pa. Super. 246, 82 A.2d 331 (1951). See textual material relating to note 53
supra.
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released the wife from all of the obligations in that agreement. This
case looked at the postnuptial agreement as a simple contract and
allowed the failure of consideration to be asserted as a defense to the
agreement thus allowing the wife to take against her husband's will.
7 4
Fratoni's Estate75 looked at the question of whether a postnuptial
agreement which provided for the mutual release of the interests of each
others' estates was revoked by implication by a provision in the will of
one spouse that the other spouse be his executrix. The court held that
an executorship is not an interest and that the postnuptial agreement
only revoked distributive interests not this executorship.76
One must be able to distinguish between postnuptial and separation
agreements because one can apply the case law principles of antenuptial
agreements to the former but not the latter. This is important to the
practitioner as far as predictability so that he will be able to decide
exactly how the court will treat his agreement. As in the area of ante-
nuptial agreements, many questions are left unanswered in the field of
postnuptial agreements. Though the Ratony77 case held that antetuptial
agreement principles are applicable to postnuptial agreements, one
must ask whether the converse is true. One must also question whether
the courts will be as strict in applying the Hillegass antenuptial pro-
visions in postnuptial agreement cases as in antenuptial cases.
VII. ELEMENTS NECESSARY IN ANTENUPTIAL AND
POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
The practitioner in preparing a marital agreement must make sure
to include the following mandatory elements and may include any or
all of the following permissible elements in order to have a valid, bind-
ing agreement.
A. Mandatory Elements
A reasonable provision for the wife in light of the following criteria:
(1) financial worth of the husband; (2) financial worth of the wife; (3)
age of the parties; (4) number of children of each party; (5) intelligence
74. Levine Estate, 383 Pa. 354, 357-59, 118 A.2d 741, 743 (1955).
75. 28 Pa. D. & C. 739 (O.C. Montg. Co. 1962).
76. Id. at 740-41.
77. See textual material relating to note 67 supra.
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of parties; and (6) whether the wife aided in accumulation of the
wealth.
In lieu of an adequate provision for the wife, the husband must pro-
vide full and fair disclosure to his spouse. Courts will probably look
very carefully for evidence of overreaching in cases where the wife gets
absolutely nothing in a marital agreement in return for her giving up
of all her rights in the husband's estate. To insure the validity of an
agreement with such a provision the husband's attorney must do more
than merely provide a clause in the agreement that full and fair dis-
closure was made to the wife. Two necessary safeguards in this situation
are: (1) the hsuband attach a full and accurate statement of his assets
to the agreement; and (2) the wife is represented by independent coun-
sel at the time of the signing of the agreement.
B. Permissible Elements
Probably, as is the case in most areas of the law, the outer limits of
what court will allow to be included in marital agreements is governed
by the dictates of public policy. Even when one is within the boundaries
of public policy one must be sure to be explicit enough to accomplish
one's goals without overlooking small details. Primarily, in consid-
eration of the marital agreement, where there is either a reasonable
provision for the wife or full disclosure, there should be a clause
whereby the wife waives all rights and demands or every character and
description against the husband's estate. A waiver of this nature is
preferable because of its breadth to a waiver of the wife's right not to
take against her husband's will.
In the case of the family exemption, mentioned earlier in this com-
ment, the broad waiver will invalidate the wife's claim to the exemp-
tion while the agreement not to take against her husband's will does
not invalidate the exemption. A provision to not take against one's
spouse's will is consistent with the wife taking her family exemption.
An even better way to handle the possibility of the wife's taking a
family exemption is to both have a broad waiver and an express clause
in the agreement which specifically waives the exemption.
To solve the problem of whether an antenuptial or postnuptial agree-
ment is abrogated by divorce, the drafter need only put a clause to that
effect in the agreement. An express provision is necessary here or the
wife will continue to collect her benefits from the agreement after
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divorce. Fault in the divorce plays no role as far as abrogation, the only
way to cut off a wife after divorce is by express provision. Although no
Pennsylvania appellate case has decided the issue of whether a marital
agreement survives an annullment, by analogy, one could argue that,
as in divorce, the agreement is not abrogated unless there is a specific
provision ending the agreement at annulment.
Another place where one would need an express provision to abro-
gate the wife's receiving some money from the estate of the husband
after a broad waiver of her rights is in the case where the wife is the
executrix of her husband's estate. Even a broad waiver of rights will
not revoke this executorship by implication because the executorship
is not a distributive share of the estate. An express provision to have
one's spouse give up this executorship would operate in Pennsylvania
as a codicil to one's will and take this right away from the wife.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law in the area of Pennsylvania antenuptial agreements is not
as finalized as the Hillegass case tends to imply. Necessarily, the most
important thing to understand in this area is the disjunctive two-
pronged test which is the key to the drafting of a valid antenuptial
agreement. Having one of these two prongs in one's agreement is only
the bare bones of an antenuptial agreement. The meat of each agree-
ment should be molded to the needs of each individual's circumstances.
This writer believes that courts will go to great lengths to protect
the female partner to a marital agreement especially where she has
given up all of her rights in her husband's property in return for an un-
reasonable provision for herself. Though the black letter of the law (the
two-pronged test) holds her to this unreasonable provision where full
disclosure has been made, courts will tend to lean in the wife's direction
in construing full disclosure. Part of this problem can be alleviated if
the husband attaches a full and accurate account of his assets to the
agreement. To fully insure that the wife understands her rights when
she signs the agreement, the husband should make sure that the wife
is represented by independent counsel at this signing. The enigma
raised by this proposed situation is when the wife is represented by
counsel at the signing of the agreement which takes away her rights and
leaves her with an unreasonable provision, he will probably advise her
that she should not sign. The attorney should advise the spouse that
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she could probably bargain for a more reasonable provision in the
agreement.
The courts of Pennsylvania have long been the proponents of this
two-pronged disjunctive test for the validity of marital agreements. The
Hillegass case has cemented this basic test into Pennsylvania law while
leaving many related issues open for discussion. In view of equal pro-
tection laws for women, courts may, in the future, cease treating widows
as their wards and hold them to their antenuptial agreements where
the test has been satisfied.
HOWARD B. ZAVODNICK
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